School Vouchers: Does Increased Competition Benefit the Masses? by Konradi \u2710, Anna
The Park Place Economist
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 13
2007




This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Konradi '10, Anna (2007) "School Vouchers: Does Increased Competition Benefit the
Masses?," The Park Place Economist: Vol. 15
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol15/iss1/13
School Vouchers: Does Increased Competition Benefit the Masses?
Abstract
The following review attempts to organize and consolidate these competing schools of thought [about school
voucher programs]. In the next section, I will summarize the different policies implemented by state and
national institutions, as well as their varying degrees of effectiveness. Later sections will discuss public school
inefficiencies and nonmarket interactions such as the peer effect. A concluding section summarizes the policy
implications of the review and discusses potential directions for future research.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol15/iss1/13
The Park Place Economist, Volume XV 47
School Vouchers: Does Increased 
Competition Benefit the Masses?
Anna Konradi
I. Introduction
Three decades have passed since Milton 
Friedman proposed school vouchers as the 
answer to America’s education crisis. One of 
the most appealing aspects of Friedman’s idea 
was the claim that vouchers would increase 
competition among all schools, both public and 
private. Despite continued majority support 
for public education, lawmakers have used 
variations on Friedman’s argument to justify 
educational reforms in urban areas, which 
allow for more parental choice and encourage 
school competition (Milton Friedman and Rose 
Freidman, 1979). Today, as policy makers debate 
the value of a national school voucher program, 
economists have similarly considered the merits 
of the proposed reforms. Some conclude that a 
voucher system, which would reduce the size of 
the public school system’s market share, would 
not result in greater school efficiency; others 
argue that opening public schools to competition 
would foster dramatic improvements in inner-
city education.
The following review attempts to organize 
and consolidate these competing schools of 
thought.   In the next section, I will summarize 
the different policies implemented by state and 
national institutions, as well as their varying 
degrees of effectiveness. Later sections will 
discuss public school inefficiencies and non-
market interactions such as the peer effect. 
A concluding section summarizes the policy 
implications of the review and discusses potential 
directions for future research. 
 Anna Konradi is a first-year political science 
and economics double major from Zionsville, Indi-
ana. She wrote “School Vouchers: Does Increased 
Competition Benefit the Masses?” for her Urban Eco-
nomics class.
II. School Voucher Policies
David Figlio and Cecilia Rouse (2005) study 
the effects of the threat of school vouchers and 
school stigma in Florida on the performance of 
“low-performing” schools using student-level 
data from a subset of several critical districts. 
Under Jeb Bush’s A+ Plan, districts administer 
standardized tests for all grade levels between 3 
and 10, with grades 4, 5, and 8 being the “critical 
grades” that the states use to evaluate school 
performance. Districts that perform particularly 
poorly are forced to offer their students vouchers 
to attend other institutions. As an additional 
incentive to school districts to improve their 
performance, all test scores are made public. 
The results of this study are not altogether 
surprising. Schools across the board focus 
additional attention on their low-performing 
students and increased their scores on subsequent 
standardized exams. However, Figlio and 
Rouse (2005) find that the key asset of Florida’s 
accountability system is not the threat of the 
vouchers themselves, but rather the stigma 
attached to having to publicly advertise poor 
test scores. The results of the study indicate 
that the A+ Plan (as will its protégé No Child 
Left Behind) increases student performance by 
requiring accountability at every grade level, but 
not because of the threat of school vouchers. 
Programs to enhance the quality of 
education are not limited to the United States. 
Sweden is perhaps the world’s most radical 
example of school reform, when in the 1990s 
it instituted an innovative voucher system 
and parental choice reform. In contrast to US 
programs whereby vouchers are usually given 
to the poorest students in low-performing 
institutions, the Swedish system makes the 
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program universal. Unlike the American system, 
independent schools cannot refuse admission to 
low-ability students, so school systems cannot 
isolate high-ability students, and their presence 
among lower-performing counterparts produces 
a positive externality (Sandström and Bergström, 
2005). The results of the study indicate not 
only that the voucher system is beneficial for 
the holistic population of Swedish students, 
but also improves the quality of education for 
students with a poor socio-economic background. 
Municipal schools, which for the most part 
disapproved of the Swedish reforms, had to 
improve the quality of their own districts in order 
to stay competitive with the new independent 
schools. Grades and test score increases are 
statistically significant across the board, and 
the study does not find any evidence of grade 
inflation in either the municipalities or in the 
independent school systems (Sandström and 
Bergström, 2005). In contrast to the Figlio and 
Rouse (2005) experiment, the Swedish system 
bypasses the standardized testing step. It finds 
that the vouchers themselves, and not just the 
threat of giving them away, have proven to be an 
advantageous policy in this country. 
III. School Inefficiencies
Many education reformers hope that the 
implementation of a voucher program will 
help to eliminate public school inefficiencies 
across the country. When met with the threat 
of a program, it is thought that schools will 
significantly reduce the amount of wasteful 
spending that goes into teachers’ and 
administrators’ salaries. 
According to a study by Ronald Erhenberg, 
Richard Chaykowski, and Randy Erhenberg 
(1988, p.397), the financial incentive offered 
to school administrators does not “seem strong 
enough to elicit much extra effort from a 
superintendent to improve his school district’s 
performance.” The authors find a statistically 
significant correlation between superintendent 
salaries and student performance for only some 
of their specifications. There is no correlation 
between superintendent salaries and the school 
district’s performance. 
While upper level administrators do not 
seem to be the main contributing factors, lower 
school performance in the public sector could, 
in part at least, be a result of highly powerful 
teacher organizations. When unions gain power 
in a district, they draw power away from the 
administrators to put it in the hands of teachers 
and other personnel. Their power is derived 
from the union’s ability to control and monitor 
the education process by influencing hiring, 
regulating the evaluation of teachers, and 
encouraging conformity amongst their own 
(Rangazas, 1997). The produced inefficiency, 
commonly referred to as the X-inefficiency, is 
thus caused by the public school’s inability to 
control teacher effort relative to the ability of the 
private school system to do the same. Randall 
Eberts and Joe Stone (1986) quantitatively 
determine that unions lower performance, 
raise the cost of education, or both. However, 
these studies contradict Michael Kurth (1987), 
who finds that unions actually raise student 
performance, while only slightly increasing 
wages. 
Another school of thought is the idea that 
there is an inefficient mix between administrative 
and teacher inputs in the school budget. Peter 
Rangazas (1997), in his budget maximizing 
model, hypothesizes that bureaucrats in the 
public school sector are profit-maximizers, and 
are thus more concerned about maximizing 
the size of their agencies than maximizing 
the agencies’ stated objectives. Unlike the 
other studies in this section of the analysis, 
Rangazas finds that vouchers would reduce the 
inefficiency in the public sector, but cause greater 
inefficiencies in the private market (thus hurting 
the children of families who would attend private 
schools with or without the voucher program). 
John Chubb and Terry Moe (1990) quantify 
the effects of restrictions placed on principals by 
both the administrations and the unions. They 
find that an index measure of organizational 
effectiveness (which includes factors such as 
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academic excellence, principal motivation, 
teacher professionalism, disciplinary fairness 
and effectiveness) is correlated significantly with 
student performance. Those schools that have 
a high degree of organizational effectiveness 
are also the ones which granted their principals 
greater discretion over curriculum and personnel 
decisions. According to the Chubb and Moe 
(1990) study, a more efficient solution than 
vouchers would be to centralize responsibility in 
the hands of principals in the public sector. 
A study by Maria Jose Luengo-Prado and 
Oscar Volij (2003) characterizes the general 
observations of the X-inefficiency subscribers. 
They show that the introduction of a voucher 
system may result in a Pareto improvement as 
an equilibrium outcome. That is, they show that 
the equilibrium in an economy without vouchers 
is inefficient (because parents who are willing to 
pay the higher cost of a better education for their 
students cannot, because of budget constraints, 
afford to relocate to a better district, and are 
thus compelled to send their children to local 
schools), and that the introduction of a voucher 
system, without additional government money 
transfers, would result in a more preferred state 
of affairs whereby parents would have a greater 
ability to exercise their roles as consumers in a 
free market. 
IV. School Vouchers and the Peer Effect
The voucher system alone does not appear 
to be solely responsible for the increases in 
educational performance. Other variables, 
such as the peer effect, play an important role 
in bettering the education system for students 
who can take advantage of the new voucher 
programs. In their study on peer effects in the 
Chinese secondary education system, Weili Ding 
and Steven Lehrer (2006) explore how non-
market (or social) interactions affect education 
outcomes. The premise of their research contends 
that each student influences his classmates not 
only through knowledge spillovers and how 
teachers respond to him, but also in how he 
affects classroom standards. 
In their experiment, Ding and Lehrer 
(2006) exploit the Chinese system to isolate the 
peer effect from teacher quality (this variable 
is explicitly quantified in the Chinese system) 
and other variables. Their data indicate that 
“peer groups operate in a non-linear manner” 
and that individual students respond negatively 
to a variation in peer quality (p. 32). Because 
the peer group effects are substantial, an 
appropriate government policy might be to 
exploit them by optimally grouping students in 
different classrooms in order to achieve specific 
educational and long-term socioeconomic results. 
These findings exist in concert with those of 
Sandström and Bergström (2005), as they both 
credit the positive peer effects with substantial 
increases in education quality. 
The peer effect can be extended beyond the 
reach of the international systems. Even in the 
United States, researchers such as James Poterba 
(1995) point out that a positive peer effect 
correlates significantly with graduation rates, 
SAT scores, and university attendance rates. 
What Poterba’s (1995) study fails to indicate, 
however, is that many of the private schools 
which would have these positive peer effects 
select on the basis of competency. Thus sub-
par students in low-performing schools would 
have nowhere to turn to with their vouchers. 
They face the possibility of being left in a low-
performing school, which could suffer from 
an even more dire lack of funding than before. 
Such is the case made by Stephen Ferris and 
Edwin West (2004 p. 23), who conclude that a 
negative external effect of vouchers would be to 
encourage for-profit private institutions to “skim 
the cream off” off the public school system and 
thus lower the average quality of the students left 
behind. According to Ferris and West, even if a 
voucher system improved the overall efficiency 
of the educational system, it would exacerbate 
inequalities across districts. 
V. Conclusion
Recent studies have demonstrated that 
Friedman’s original thesis is in no way bullet 
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proof. While it is possible that a voucher 
system could increase the quality of education 
for students in poor districts, scholars around 
the table seem to agree that the voucher 
itself only plays a small role in consumer 
satisfaction. Other factors such as administrative 
and union inefficiency and the peer effect 
direct policymakers toward other avenues of 
exploration. While the voucher system might 
help improve the quality of education in 
low-income districts, the threat of a voucher 
may impact the mentality of the “education 
producers.” Administrators and teachers alike 
may become less self-serving profit maximizers 
and instead focus more of their energy on the 
quality of their output (education). 
It is yet to be seen whether the voucher 
system can ever have nationwide success. But 
before such a policy could ever be implemented, 
lawmakers should consider exploring the 
positive and negative social implications of the 
proposal. On the one hand, a voucher system 
may result in the more efficient use of public 
resources in education. On the other, vouchers 
could exacerbate economic, racial, or ability 
segregation. Under a system where the value of 
the voucher does not cover the full cost of tuition 
at the private institution, the poorest students and 
their families will be left in the public schools, 
possibly with even fewer resources than before. 
With their more affluent classmates away, the 
most destitute students are likely to be deprived 
of the positive peer effects associated with high 
performing students and their own standards for 
personal excellence could suffer as a result. 
Another possibility to consider is the 
impact of vouchers on the social morale of the 
community. The public school has traditionally 
been a haven for community cohesiveness, 
a place where residents can put aside their 
differences and participate in a common cause.  
Would the introduction of the voucher system 
taint this unity or would it bring the district 
together to participate in a mass re-bolstering of 
public education? All these possible implications 
should be carefully considered before any drastic 
changes are made to the present system. Another 
possible avenue to consider would be the cultural 
differences that make programs work across 
different countries. Would the individualistic 
mindset commonly associated with the United 
States ever be able to accept the type of universal 
voucher program that exists in more liberal 
Sweden? Could we ever segregate students based 
on ability as they do in China?
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